Federal Agency Investigations: Requirements for the Production of Documents by Cooper, Frank E.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 60 Issue 2 
1961 
Federal Agency Investigations: Requirements for the Production 
of Documents 
Frank E. Cooper 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Evidence Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Frank E. Cooper, Federal Agency Investigations: Requirements for the Production of Documents, 60 MICH. 
L. REV. 187 (1961). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol60/iss2/4 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
FEDERAL AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS: REQUIRE-
MENTS FOR THE PRODUCTION OF 
DOCUMENTSt 
Frank E. Cooper* 
THE United States district courts are frequently called upon to decide whether an administrative agency is entitled to en-
forcement of a subpoena requesting production of documentary 
evidence which the person to whom the subpoena is addressed as-
sails as an unnecessary and improper inquisitorial investigation. 
In considering such requests for enforcement, the district 
courts have little to guide them except (I) the statement found 
in section 6 (c) of the Administrative Procedure Act that the court 
shall sustain the subpoena "to the extent that it is found to be in 
accordance with law" ;1 and (2) the declaration of the Court in 
Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling2 (decided a few months 
before enactment of the act) that the three basic tests by which 
to determine whether the subpoena is "in accordance with law" 
are (a) whether the inquiry is one the demanding agency is 
authorized by law to make; (b) whether the materials specified 
are relevant to an authorized inquiry; (c) whether the disclosure 
sought is unreasonable. 
Neither the statute nor the decision-landmarks though they 
both are-offers a convenient rule of thumb to guide the district 
courts in the intensely difficult problems posed by requests for 
enforcement of administrative subpoenas. 
However, an examination of the decisions passing upon such 
requests does disclose the standards by which the courts apply the 
three classic tests, and suggests certain practical guides. This arti-
cle reports the results of such an examination. 
t This article is based on the product of a research project conducted by a seminar 
group at The University of Michigan Law School. The group undertook to read all 
the reported cases decided during the past twelve years dealing with the enforcement 
of administrative subpoenas in an attempt to determine the standards by which the 
courts decide whether a subpoena is in accordance with law. Members of the seminar 
were Ceferino Gaddi, Edward Keller, Robert Margolin, David Reed, Dean Ship-
man, Marvin Vvilenzik, and Morton Zedd; Denis Rice was director of research 
for the group.-Ed. 
• Of the Detroit Bar; Professor of Law, University of Michigan.-Ed. 
1 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1005 (c) (1958). 
!l 327 U.S. 186 (1946). 
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The prevailing interpretation of the three basic tests sug-
gested in the Oklahoma Press case will be first discussed; there-
after a brief analysis will be made of the seven subsidiary prin-
ciples most often urged in the application of the three basic tests. 
I. INTERPRETATION OF THE THREE BASIC TESTS 
A. Defense That Issuance of Subpoena Is Not Authorized 
by Statute 
It is commonplace that an agency does not have power to issue 
a subpoena except as authorized by statute. This is established 
both by case law and by the provisions of the APA.8 
As the Court phrased it in Oklahoma Press, the initial ques-
tion is whether "the inquiry is one the demanding agency is 
authorized by law to make."4 In other words, when enforcement 
of an administrative subpoena is resisted, the court first looks 
to the statute creating the agency to determine whether it author-
izes the issuance of the subpoena. 
In making this determination, the task of the court is not the 
barren legalistic one of rhetorical construction of the statutory 
provision. The courts do not make a fortress of the dictionary, 
nor deem their task one which can be accomplished by dispassion-
ate, disinterested construction of the language found in the stat-
ute. Rather, they consider the consequences of alternate construc-
tions. 
Thus, where the agency is authorized to compel by subpoena 
the appearance of witnesses, it is held in immigration cases that 
the person against whom the agency is proceeding is not a witness, 
but in Federal Trade Commission cases such person is a witness/' 
Why does the word witness have a broader meaning in one 
statute than in the other? In the immigration case, the Court 
said that a restrictive reading of the "Janus-faced word 'witness'" 
was proper in view of the circumstance that the power to issue 
subpoenas was not restricted to the heads of the agency but was 
delegated to "any immigration officer"; and the subpoena power 
3 See Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357 (1942), and 60 Stat. 240 (1946), 
5 U .S.C. § 1005 (b) , (c) (1958) . 
4 327 U.S. at 208. 
5 Compare United States v. Minker, 350 U.S. 179 (1956) (immigration) with FI'C 
v. Scientific Living, Inc., 150 F. Supp. 495 (D. Pa. 1957) • 
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"is a power capable of oppressive use, especially when it may be 
indiscriminately delegated and the subpoena is not returnable 
before a judicial officer."11a The Court apparently believed that 
grave mischief might result if the term "witness" were given its 
natural reading as meaning any person subpoenaed to testify. 
In Federal Trade Commission cases, on the other hand, where 
there is less fear of the consequences of oppressive use of the 
subpoena power, the word "witness" is read as including re-
spondents as well as anyone else. 
The ability of the Court to read statutory language restrictively, 
as illustrated by the immigration case, is paralleled by its ability 
to read statutory language expansively, where to do so is deemed 
to accomplish a desirable result. Such expansive reading is illus-
trated in FTC v. Tuttle6 and FTC v. Bowman.7 Both cases involved 
the same question. The FTC was authorized by statute "to copy 
any documentary evidence of any corporation being investigated 
... [ and] to require by subpoena ... the production of all such 
documentary evidence ... .''8 Did this authorize the Commission 
to require the production of documentary evidence of a corpora-
tion not being investigated-or did the phrase "such documentary 
evidence" indicate that the right to subpoena was no broader 
than the right to copy, i.e., that in eiili;er case the power could 
be exercised only with respect to a corporation being investigated? 
This latter restrictive construction would seem to be justified 
(if not required, as eloquently argued by Judge Medina in his 
dissent in the Tuttle case) by the plain language of the statute. 
But both courts facing this question found that the public need 
for broad investigatory powers justified the expansive reading 
for which the Commission contended. 
These two cases illustrate the great change which has occurred 
during the past thirty-five years in the willingness of courts to 
adopt a liberal construction of statutory language, where it is felt 
that such construction is socially desirable.9 
l!a United States v. Minker, supra note 5, at 187, quoting Cudahy Packing Co. v. 
Holland, 315 U.S. 357, 363 (1941). 
6 244 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1957). 
7 248 F.2d 456 (7th Cir. 1957) • 
s Federal Trade Commission Act, 38 Stat. 722 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 49 (1958). 
(Emphasis added.) 
9 In FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298 (1924), the Court held that the 
Commission's power to examine documentary evidence did not include the power to 
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But the trend is not exclusively in the direction of so-called 
liberal interpretation. In United States v. O'Connor,10 the court 
ruled that the Internal Revenue Service was not authorized to 
utilize its power to issue subpoenas for the purpose of obtaining 
information to help the Justice Department prosecute a criminal 
case. This, said the court, would be a perversion of statutory 
powers. 
Other cases decided since the enactment of the Administrative 
Procedure Act support the conclusion suggested by the cases dis-
cussed above: the statutory language authorizing agencies to issue 
subpoenas is typically cast in terms broad enough to be capable 
of being characterized as "ambiguous" whenever the court finds 
there is a need for interpretation.11 Such words as "witness," and 
"evidence," relevant to a "matter" within the "jurisdiction" of the 
agency, all afford a wide area for judicial interpretation-either 
for a broad and expansive interpretation which results in almost 
unlimited power to issue subpoenas, or in tight restrictive defini-
tion which greatly limits the subpoena power. The same courts 
which at times engage in broad interpretation, on other occasions 
engage in restrictive interpretation, apparently being influenced 
by their judgment as to the social desirability of empowering a 
particular agency to obtain a certain type of information under 
the stated circumstances. 
B. Defense of Irrelevancy 
It is impossible to reconcile the many decisions passing upon 
the defense that the subpoena should not be enforced because 
of the asserted irrelevancy of the material sought. Nor is it pos-
examine the documents of the very corporation being investigated unless the Commis-
sion could show that those documents contained information that would be relevant 
to the Commission's charge (because unless they contained relevant information they 
would not be "evidence") . There, the construction was so strict as almost to choke 
off the Commission's powers of investigation. Now the pendulum has swung far in 
the opposite direction, and the Commission may examine documents of companies 
not under investigation, in the hope they might turn up something relevant to a 
company that is under investigation. 
10 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953). 
11 See United States v. Zuskar, 237 F.2d 528 (7th Cir. 1956); Sale v. United States, 
228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1956); General Trades School v. United States, 212 F.2d 656 
(8th Cir. 1954); Carroll Vocational Institute v. United States, 211 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 
1954). 
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sible to derive from them any convenient horn-book rule. The 
fundamental reason for the difficulty faced by the courts when 
the question of relevancy is raised arises from the fact that the 
court is asked to determine the relevancy of unknown documents 
to unspecified issues-a rather difficult feat for even the most 
agile judges. The agency has not seen the documents it is de-
manding; not knowing what the documents might reveal, it is 
difficult for counsel for the agency to establish their relevancy. 
Counsel for respondent has a slightly different problem. He knows 
the contents of the documents, to be sure, but he does not wish 
to reveal them; and it is a bit difficult to establish the irrelevancy 
of a document whose contents one does not wish to disclose. Fur-
ther, when the issue of relevancy is argued, the actual issues in-
volved in the administrative proceeding may not yet have been 
crystallized. 
Faced with this practical difficulty, the courts are inclined to\,-
say that the agency has discharged whatever initial burden may · 
be imposed on it as moving party, if it accompanies the applica-
tion with an affidavit setting forth such information as may be 
presently available to it indicating why it believes the subpoenaed \ 
material will be of material aid to the agency. It is important that 
the agency make such a showing. Many judges exhibit a much \; 
less hospitable attitude when an agency demands enforcement 
of a subpoena without thus explaining its need for the informa-
tion. If the court feels it is being asked to rubber-stamp the 
agency's subpoenas, an attitude of judicial resentment frequently 
appears.12 
There can be found in the cases strong and explicit statements 
that relevancy must be shown before the subpoena will be en-
forced.13 However, most courts rule that if the agency has made 
an initial showing that the desired information may be "reasonably 
relevant,"14 the burden shifts to the respondent to "disprove" its 
12 See, e.g., Chapman v. Maren Elwood College, 225 F.2d 230 (9th Cir. 1955). 
13 Thus, in Hermann v. CAB, 237 F.2d 359, 362 (9th Cir. 1956), rev'd, 353 U.S. 
322 (1957) , the court said: "In order to have the subpoena enforced, the issue as to 
whether each of the documents subpoenaed is relevant and material is a judicial ques• 
tion which must be passed on by the courts." The same court, in Hubner v. Tucker, 
245 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1957), said that a lack of specification of particular documents 
precluded a showing that any one of the documents was relevant, and that accordingly 
an IRS subpoena would not be enforced. 
14 FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
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relevancy,15 and the courts are generally inclined to overrule a 
defense of irrelevancy unless the party resisting the subpoena 
makes it appear plainly to the court that the documents in question 
are "palpably irrelevant" or "plainly incompetent,"16 or that they 
have "no potential relevancy." The phrases vary, but the general 
effect is that a heavy burden of persuasion is placed on defendant 
if he is to convince the court that production of the material 
should be denied for reasons of irrelevancy alone.17 
Of course, it is a rare case where the defense of irrelevancy 
is raised alone. Almost every case which involves the demanded 
production of allegedly irrelevant documents also involves de-
mands which the defendant conceives to be unduly burdensome. 
In deciding cases, the district judges exhibit a tendency to con-
sider "irrelevancy" as a sort of secondary defense. If the court 
feels that the subpoena as a whole imposes an unconscionable 
burden upon defendant, and that enforcement would not be in 
the public interest, it is likely to throw in as an additional reason 
for denying enforcement the statement that the documents appear 
to be largely irrelevant.18 
In the end, it would seem that enforcement of the subpoena 
is not likely to be denied on grounds of irrelevancy unless de-
l fendant makes a strong showing that the documents are obviously 
; irrelevant, and further that their production would cause so sub-
• stantial a burden that enforcement of the request would involve 
i an unreasonable interference with protected rights of privacy. 
C. Defense of Undue Burden 
The Supreme Court in the Oklahoma Press case did not define 
the "unreasonable disclosure" that is proscribed as being oppres-
sive and unduly burdensome. However, applications of this test 
by the lower courts indicate that the mere circumstance that 
15 Shaughnessy v. Bacolas, 135 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
16 Jackson Packing Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1953). 
17 See Kilgore Nat'l Bank v. Federal Petroleum Bd., 209 F.2d 557 (5th Cir. 1954). 
18 Conversely, where the demand appears on the whole to be fair and proper, 
the courts may require submission of a specified group of records (e.g., time records 
of all employees) even•though some of them are concededly irrelevant, on the eminently 
practical ground that the easiest way to separate the relevant from the irrelevant is to 
let the agency sort them out. See McComb v. Hunsaker Trucking Contractor, Inc., 
171 F.2d 523 (5th Cir. 1948). 
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compliance with the requirements of the subpoena will be expen-
sive and will interfere with the conduct of respondent's business 
does not in itself often afford a basis for refusal to enforce the sub-
poena. Rather, the courts take into consideration the character 
of the administrative investigation, the apparent importance to 
the agency of the documents in question (i.e., their potential 
relevancy), and the purpose of the agency in issuing the sub-
poena. 
A succinct phrase of Judge Hutcheson in Winn & Lovett 
Grocery v. NLRB19 suggests the attitude which apparently is char-
acteristic of the district courts and courts of appeals in considering 
contentions that a subpoena is unduly burdensome. He suggests 
that if it appears to the court on the whole record that the purpose 
of the subpoena is to "annoy and embarrass" rather than to "dis-
cover and reveal," the court may deny enforcement. 
Usually something more than inconvenience is involved where 
the court finds the disclosure demanded "unreasonable," and the 
requirements of the subpoena therefore unduly burdensome. It 
is noteworthy that in most of the cases where a court has relied on 
the undue burden imposed by a subpoena in declining applica-
tion for enforcement, there is a strong suggestion that the sub-
poena was issued for improper purposes.20 
The considerations that sway the court were well stated in 
FCC v. Cohn,21 where the court spoke of the "necessity for drawing 
lines between the protection of the public interest . . . and the 
19 213 F.2d 785, 786 (5th Cir. 1954) • 
20 Thus, enforcement has been denied where: (1) a subpoena requiring production of 
service certificates of seamen was apparently utilized as an indirect means of effecting 
a temporary suspension of their licenses, pending a hearing-a suspension which the 
agency was without authority to accomplish by direct order. In re Merchant Mariners 
Documents Issued to Dimitatos, 91 F. Supp. 426 (N.D. Cal. 1949); (2) a subpoena was 
issued after the respondent had refused to accept what the court described as a 
"penalty arbitrarily fixed" by representatives of the agency, who then issued the sub-
poena apparently with the purpose of exerting pressure upon respondent to accept 
the proposed penalty. Chapman v. Maren Elwood College, 225 F.2d 230, 233 (9th Cir. 
1955) ; (3) a subpoena requiring a large number of companies to produce their records 
at a distance far removed from their offices was issued not in connection with any 
scheduled hearing, but apparently for the convenience of an agency attorney who in 
preparing for a contemplated hearing thought it would be more convenient to him 
to have all the witnesses (not parties to the case) bring their records to his offices, 
rather than following the customary course of traveling to the offices of the prospec-
tive witnesses and seeing what relevant evidence their records might disclose. NLRB v. 
Pesante, 119 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Cal. 1954). 
21 154 F. Supp. 899, 904. (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
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rights of individual businessmen to pursue their legitimate busi-
ness activities without being subjected to unnecessary and harass-
ing governmental inquisition." The court declared, "There are 
many instances where the drawing of such lines might exclude 
agencies of the Government from pursuing inquiries into purely 
private business affairs, absent sufficiently broad or sufficiently de-
fined grant of power by Congress concerning subject matter with-
in the realm of the public interest." In enforcing the subpoena 
(with some limitations) the court concluded that while the pro-
duction of the materials subpoenaed "would place a considerable 
burden upon the respondents, I do not feel that such burden is 
so great as to be unreasonable and oppressive in the light of the 
purposes to be served by the ... investigation."22 
The courts exhibit diligence in discovering practical means to 
modify the command of the subpoena, where literal compliance 
would be unnecessarily burdensome. Among the devices employed 
toward this end are (1) requirements that the agency take steps 
to avoid public disclosure of trade secrets revealed to it,23 (2) pro-
visions for examination of the documents by agency representatives 
at respondent's place of business,24 and (3) provisions for produc-
tion of the documents over a period of time, so that respondent 
will not be deprived of all his records at once.25 
While there are dicta in a few cases that inconvenience to 
respondent is never in itself enough to make the demand unduly 
oppressive,26 it appears that if the inconvenience is truly burden-
some, the courts will take this into account by requiring the wit-
22 Id. at 912. The balancing of the perennially competing public and private in-
terests is nicely demonstrated in cases involving demands by revenue agents for re• 
examination of tax records concerning years that have been previously examined, or 
years that are "closed" by the statute, in absence of fraud. As the factual complexion 
of cases in this area is altered by particular factors, so the results obtained vary. See 
O'Connor v. O'Connell, 253 F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1958); Application of United States 
(In re Carroll), 246 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1957), and cases cited therein. 
23 See FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) , in which the court author-
ized, in lieu of production of documents, a statement signed by a responsible officer of 
the company whose records were subpoenaed, setting forth the information which 
would be shown by all the documents. See also Winn 8: Lovett Grocery Co. v. NLRB, 
213 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1954) ("in lieu" proviso suggested by the agency). 
24 See CAB v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322 (1957). 
25 Ibid. 
26 See, e.g., Westside Ford v. United States, 206 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Applica• 
tion of Compton, 101 F. Supp. 547 (N.D. Tex. 1951). 
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ness to produce only such information as is necessary to the at-
tainment of the proper objectives of the agency. 
Where the person subpoenaed is not involved in the admin-
istrative proceedings except as a witness, the courts are more likely 
to attach importance to a plea that the demands of the subpoena 
are unduly burdensome. Thus, in two cases enforcement has been 
denied to subpoenas which would have required banks to under-
take a prodigious search of all their records to discover whether 
certain individuals under investigation by the Internal Revenue 
Service had purchased bank credits.27 
II. SEVEN SUBSIDIARY PRINCIPLES 
A. Defense That Agency Does Not Have Jurisdiction Over 
Respondent 
It is a troublesome and unsettled question whether, in a case 
where an agency asserts jurisdiction, the Court should, before en-
forcing the agency's subpoena, make an independent inquiry as to 
whether the agency does in fact possess the asserted jurisdiction.28 
The lower federal courts for years had believed it proper to 
make at least a preliminary investigation of the alleged lack of 
agency jurisdiction to issue a subpoena.29 Typical of the trend of 
decisions are the two which provided the setting for the precedent-
making determination in the Oklahoma Press case.30 In both cases, 
the Wage and Hour Division had sought production of records 
in connection with investigations under the wage-hour law. The 
Courts of Appeals for the Third and Tenth Circuits, respectively, 
enforced the subpoenas-the Third on the basis that the agency 
had shown reasonable grounds for making the investigation, and 
the Tenth on the grounds that the agency had shown probable 
21 First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947); United States 
ex rel. Sathre v. Third N.W. Nat'l Bank, 102 F. Supp. 879 (D. Minn. 1955) • 
28 The question appears not to have been considered by the Supreme Court prior 
to Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943). That decision did not dis-
pose of the problem. It appeared to be limited principally to cases involving govern-
ment contractors and, indeed, it was far from clear that any actual question of lack 
of jurisdiction was involved. 
29 See cases collected in Note, 56 YALE L.J. 165 (1946). 
so The Court combined for decision Walling v. News Printing Co., 148 F.2d 57 
(3d Cir. 1945) and Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 147 F.2d 658 (10th Cir. 
1945). 
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cause.31 On appeal, these two cases were consulted and the Su-
preme Court indicated that the applications for enforcement 
should have been granted without examination of these jurisdic-
tional questions, and strongly hinted that the issue of lack of 
jurisdiction could not be raised as a defense on application for 
enforcement of a subpoena, that being a question to be determined, 
at least in the first instance, by the agency itself.32 
The continued adherence to this decision has been widely 
criticized as in effect nullifying the explicit provision of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act that an agency subpoena should be 
enforced only if it is found to be "in accordance with law," for it 
would seem that an agency should not be permitted to examine 
the affairs of respondents over whom it lacks jurisdiction, 33 never-
theless it appears that the rule of the Oklahoma Press case has sur-
vived the act. 
The Fifth Circuit has specifically declared that the Administra-
tive Procedure Act has not modified the rule of the Oklahoma 
Press case.34 The Ninth Circuit found authority in the act to 
deny enforcement of an FTC subpoena which called for a mass 
of material, at least part of which was thought to relate to matters 
clearly beyond the Commission's jurisdiction.35 But this decision 
31 Walling v. News Printing Co., supra note 30, at 60; Oklahoma Press Publishing 
Co. v. Walling, supra note 30, at 662. 
32 327 U.S. at 214. 
33 The Oklahoma Press case was decided in February 1946, three months before the 
enactment of the Administrative Procedure Act, and the decision apparently was not 
considered by Congress in adopting that statute. As one commentator put it, although 
the draftsmen of the act undoubtedly felt that private parties should be allowed to 
raise the defense of lack of agency jurisdiction in a subpoena enforcement proceeding, 
they did not include an express provision to that effect because they deemed it un• 
necessary. Schwartz, The Administrative Procedure Act in Operation, 29 N.Y.U.L. R.Ev. 
1173 (1954) • 
The legislative history of the Administrative Procedure Act is not clear on this 
point. While the Senate Judiciary Committee Report and the floor explanation de• 
livered by the chairman of the House Subcommittee indicate a purpose to require 
some judicial scrutiny of the agency's jurisdiction, they conflict as to the scope of 
this authority. The Senate Report indicated it would be enough if the court were 
satisfied that the agency could possibly find that it had jurisdiction. S. REP. No. 752, 
79th Cong., 1st Sess. 20 (1945) • The House Report indicated that the phrase "in 
accordance with law" meant that the subpoena should be enforced only if the facts 
demonstrated that the persons and subject matter to which the subpoena was directed 
were within the jurisdiction of the agency. H. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 32-33 
(1946). 
34 Tobin v. Banks &: Rumbaugh, 201 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1953); D. G. Bland Lumber 
Co. v. NLRB, 177 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1949). 
35 FTC v. Crafts, 244 F.2d 882 (9th Cir. 1957) • 
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was reversed by the Supreme Court in a one-sentence per curiam 
opinion,36 citing Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins37 and Okla-
homa Press. 
Unfortunately, it is not clear just what the Oklahoma Press 
case stands for. It seemingly does not prevent a court from deny-
ing enforcement of a subpoena if it appears clear that the re-
spondent is not subject to the agency's jurisdiction. But if the 
issue is doubtful, most of the courts feel obliged to enforce the 
subpoena. 
Apparently the only relief from the uncertain and unsatisfac-
tory state of affairs now existing in this area is by legislative en-
actment. The Hoover Commission Task Force on Legal Services 
and Procedure concluded that the jurisdictional question should 
be considered by the courts in proceedings to enforce subpoenas, 
to a limited extent, viz.: "The court shall quash the subpoena ... 
to the extent that it finds the same ... beyond the probable juris-
diction of the agency .... "38 
B. Fishing Expeditions 
When one goes fishing, he casts about in all directions as far 
as he can; he probes the bottom with sinker and hook; and he may 
indeed utilize a net to sieve the entire contents of a lake. Whether 
federal agencies may utilize such tactics in their search for infor-
mation would seem to depend, in the present state of the law, 
upon the breadth of the investigatory power delegated to the 
agency by the governing statute. 
No longer can the mere characterization of the agency's ac-
tivity as a "fishing expedition" serve to brand the search as illegal. 
The philosophy of an earlier day, which held unconstitutional any 
"roving inquisitorial investigation"39 has been displaced by an 
attitude which led the Court in United States v. Morton Salt Co.40 
to declare that the mere fact that "courts could not go fishing" 
does not mean that administrative agencies must be deprived of 
36 FTC v. Crafts, 355 U.S. 9 (1957). 
37 317 U.S. 501 (1943). 
38 Proposed Administrative Code § 204 (b)' COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE 
EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, Legal Services and Procedure, A Report to the 
Congress 368 (1955) • 
39 See Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936); Harriman v. ICC, 211 U.S. 407 (1908). 
40 338 U.S. 632 (1950). 
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the pleasure. Indeed, said the Court in the same case, even if the 
agency's request were regarded "as caused by nothing more than 
official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing agencies have a legiti-
mate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is con-
sistent with the law and the public interest." Rather the test is, 
the Court continued, that "the disclosure sought shall not be un-
reasonable. " 41 
In determining the reasonableness of the disclosure, the courts 
consider a number of factors.42 In the Morton Salt case, it seems 
probable that the Court was influenced by the fact that the Com-
mission wanted to learn whether respondent was in compliance 
with the requirements of an order previously entered against it. 
It may be doubted whether so broad an inquiry would have been 
sustained if addressed to one who had not previously been found 
to have been engaged in illegal trade practices. Similarly, it may 
be doubted whether, if an agency undertook on its own initiative 
a general investigation to obtain all the information it could as to 
the business practices of television stations and those doing busi-
ness with them,43 it would be permitted to make so broad an in-
quiry as that permitted in the cited case, where the investigation 
had been specifically authorized by Congress. 
It is suggested that there is no longer any doctrine which 
prohibits "fishing expeditions" as such. Rather, where an agency 
is proceeding to drag the nets of inquiry, in the hope that a tasty 
fish may be caught, the court will test the legality of the demand 
in terms of statutory authorization, the potential relevancy and 
significance of the information sought, and the degree of burden 
imposed on the respondents. In other words, the courts con-
sider the same factors that are balanced whenever application for 
enforcement of a subpoena is resisted. 
As a matter of policy, there is room for debate. There have 
been indications both from Congress and from unofficial organ-
41 Id. at 652-53. 
42 Thus, if a price control agency is authorized by statute to examine all the 
records of a seller to determine whether price ceilings have been exceeded, a broad 
scope of inquiry will be permitted. Wockner v. United States, 211 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 
1954) • Also if Congress has by resolution requ_ested an agency to obtain all the in-
formation it can relating to a particular topic of congressional inquiry, a far-reaching 
search is deemed reasonable. FTC v. National Biscuit Co., 18 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.N.Y. 
1937). 
43 Cf. FCC v. Cohn, 154 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
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izations that it would be better on the whole if such broad in-
quiries were discouraged. In the committee report which ac-
companied the Administrative Procedure Act, it was said that 
section 6 (b) oI the act was "designed to preclude 'fishing expedi-
tions' " and it was asserted that "investigations may not disturb 
or disrupt personal privacy, or unreasonably interfere with private 
occupation or enterprise."44 In similar language, the Hoover Com-
mission Task Force on Legal Services and Procedure urged that 
"fishing expeditions" should not be permitted which unduly "im-
pinge on the rights of the citizen."45 _ Such considerations of policy 
are fundamentally the responsibility of legislative bodies, in de-
fining the scope of inquiry permitted. 
C. Specific Description of Documents Sought 
The contentions urged in an earlier day that each particular 
document sought must be individually described-in terms, for 
example, of a letter of a certain date from a named writer to a 
named addressee-have long since gone by the board. 
As the court observed in one recent case, it is enough if the 
documents are described as accurately as possible under the cir-
cumstances. 46 Thus, a demand for "all records relating to your 
said business for the year 1952,"47 or a demand for "records . . . 
relative to all sales of ... automobiles,"48 is considered to contain 
a sufficiently specific description of the documents sought. 
However, in any case where it is thought that the description 
is so vague as to cause real difficulty, courts feel free to modify the 
subpoena by incorporating in the court order requiring produc-
tion a more specific description of the documents to be produced.49 
D. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination 
The same general tests that apply where the privilege of the 
fifth amendment is invoked in the course of oral testimony also 
« H. REP. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 32 (1946) • 
45 COMMISSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE GOVERNMENT, 
Legal Services and Procedure, A Report to the Congress 60 (1955) • 
46 Menzies v. ITC, 242 F.2d 81 (4th Cir. 1957). 
47 United States v. Woerth, 130 F. Supp. 930, 934 (N.D. Iowa 1955). 
48 Wockner v. United States, 2ll F.2d 490, 492 (9th Cir. 1954). 
40 General Trades School, Inc. v. United States, 212 F.2d 656 (8th Cir. 1954) ; 
Wagman v. Arnold, 152 F. Supp. 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1957). 
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apply where a subpoena requiring production of documents is 
resisted on the grounds that the production of the documents 
would tend to incriminate the witness. 50 
There are, however, two particularly troublesome-and com-
pletely unsolved-problems that arise in connection with sub-
poenas duces tecum. 
First is the problem of invoking the privilege as a basis for 
refusing production of any single part of a large mass of docu-
ments. For example, if a subpoena calls for production of all 
cancelled checks from the personal checking account of a witness 
for a three-year period-or production of all letters exchanged 
with named correspondents over a lengthy period-may the wit-
ness refuse to produce any evidence at all? Or should it be said 
that the privilege is prematurely claimed if urged in blanket 
form at the outset, and that the witness must appear with the 
subpoenaed documents and raise the claim of privilege only as 
to particular documents when examination of such particular 
documents is requested? 
Either approach encompasses administrative difficulties. If 
the witness is permitted to assert the claim in blanket fashion, it 
would be put within the power of the witness to foreclose ex-
amination of documents which perhaps had no possible tendency 
to incriminate him. On the other hand, if he is restricted to the 
assertion of the privilege only as to specifically described individual 
documents, there is a danger that the very identification of the 
document, coupled with a statement of his reasons for refusing 
to produce it, might itself lead to incrimination. The problem is 
one that the courts have tried to meet, in a practical fashion, on 
the facts of the particular case. 51 
Perhaps the best solution of the problem is to avoid it by 
framing requests for production of documents in specific terms, 
50 Such tests may be summarized by saying that the court can refuse to allow the 
invocation of the privilege only if it is clear that no possible answer to the question 
(and, possibly, anticipated follow-up questions) could tend either to incriminate the 
witness or to furnish any link in a chain of testimony that might convict him of 
crime. See Justice Marshall's oft-cited statement in United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 
38, 40 (No. 14692e) (C.C.D. Va. 1807) : "Many links frequently compose that chain of 
testimony which is necessary to convict any individual of a crime. It appears to the 
court to be the true sense of the rule that no witness is compellable to furnish any one 
of them against himself.'' See also Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955). 
51 See Hubner v. Tucker, 245 F.2d 35 (9th Cir. 1957); Shaughnessy v. Bacolas, 135 
F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). 
1961] AGENCY INVESTIGATIONS: DOCUMENTS 201 
rather than to rely on broad, all-inclusive demands. If the par-
ticular categories of documents which the agency requests are 
specifically described, the court can more readily see whether there 
is a possibility that all documents falling within the class described 
might have a tendency to incriminate. 
Even more troublesome is the doctrine of Shapiro v. United 
States, 52 that records which one is required by law to keep become 
ipso facto public records, and that the privilege does not apply to 
public records. Despite the eloquent expostulation in the three 
dissenting opinions in the Shapiro case of the dangers which would 
result if this doctrine were applied without limitation, the lower 
courts have exhibited some tendency to apply it in axiomatic 
fashion to refuse to permit a witness to assert the privilege with 
respect to any type of record which he is required by administra-
tive regulation to keep. 53 
There must be limits to this doctrine; surely the courts would 
not sustain a scheme requiring all residents of the United States 
to keep a diary of all their acts, and providing for the production 
of the diary upon subpoena. The limits are described, it is be-
lieved, in the majority opinion in the Shapiro case,54 where it is 
suggested that the initial question must always be whether the 
government can constitutionally require the keeping of the par-
ticular record. If by regulation an agency undertook to require 
the keeping of records reporting criminal acts, or to require the 
keeping of records so voluminous and involving such deprivation 
of well-established rights of personal privacy as to constitute the 
very requirement of keeping of the records an unreasonable 
search, it would be said that the keeping of such a record could 
not constitutionally be required, and that the doctrine of the 
Shapiro case would be inapplicable. It is perhaps significant that 
the doctrine has been applied principally, if not solely, in con-
nection with records of wages paid, hours worked, imports of 
foreign goods, and the prices at which goods were sold-all areas 
in which there can be little question as to the reasonableness of 
a record-keeping requirement. 
52 335 U.S. I (1948) . 
53 See Wockner v. United States, 211 F.2d 490 (9th Cir. 1954); Wagman v. Arnold, 
152 F. Supp. 637 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); United States v. Jones, 72 F. Supp. 48 (S.D Miss. 1947). 
54 335 U.S. at 32. 
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E. Privileged Communications 
In principle, evidence which is privileged in civil proceedings 
in the courts should also be privileged in proceedings before 
administrative agencies.55 Where the question is raised in con-
nection with the taking of testimony in adversary adjudicatory 
proceedings before an agency, the claim of privilege has been 
recognized. 56 
Is the situation different where disclosure is demanded in the 
course of non-adversary investigatory proceedings by an agency? 
Considering the reasons which underlie the doctrine of privilege,u7 
it would seem that the rule should be the same in adversary and 
non-adversary proceedings; and a number of courts have recited 
their willingness to "assume ... that the conduct of investigations 
[by administrative agencies] ... is subject to the same testimonial 
privileges as judicial proceedings."58 
Further support for the conclusion that rules of privilege 
should apply in investigatory proceeding of agencies is found in 
Rule 81 (a) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, spe-
cifically providing for the applicability of the rules to proceedings 
to compel compliance with administrative subpoenas. Since the 
federal rules do apply, and since they recognize the testimonial 
privileges, 59 it would seem that enforcement of administrative 
subpoenas should be made subject to the condition that privileged 
testimony would ·not be disclosed. But, despite all this, a trend 
may be observed in recent decisions to restrict these privileges 
55 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2300 (a) (McNaughton rev. 1961). It is suggested that the 
attorney-client privilege should apply even with respect to disclosures to non-attorneys 
who are licensed to practice before a particular agency, where the regulations treat the 
persons appearing before it as having the responsibilities of attorneys and being subject 
to professional discipline. 
56 Baldwin v. Commissioner, 125 F.2d 812 (9th Cir. 1942). 
57 See 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton rev. 1961). 
58 The language is that of Learned Hand in McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 
(2d Cir. 1937) ; it has been quoted and approved in In re Albert Lindley Lee Mem. 
Hospital, 209 F.2d 122, 124 (2d Cir. 1953), and in Falsone v. United States, 205 F.2d 
734, 737 (5th Cir. 1953). The opinion in United States v. Louisville &: N.R.R., 236 U.S. 
318 (1915) , appears strongly to support this view, as does City Council v. Goldwater, 
284 N.Y. 296, 31 N.E.2d 31 (1940). The decision in SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226 
(D.D.C. 1948) , specifically applied the privilege to excuse the production in an investi-
gation by the SEC into matters protected by the attorney-client privilege. 
li9 FED. R. CIV. P. 43 (a). 
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to narrow limits in cases where the public need for information 
is great.60 
F. Delegations of Authority 
Occasionally, administrative subpoenas are resisted on the 
basis that the person acting for the agency in the matter has no 
authority to act. While such defenses have in a number of cases 
been sustained in the lower courts (perhaps for the reason that 
the court felt the request for information was, under all the cir-
cumstances, unfair, and wished to have a convenient legal point 
upon which to base its refusal to enforce the subpoena) the strong 
trend of appellate decisions is to overrule such defenses.61 
Indeed, the agencies have been successful in avoiding the 
question as to the validity of subpoenas issued by agency em-
ployees, through the simple expedient of having the agency heads 
sign subpoenas in blank, which are then supplied to staff assistants 
for use at their convenience as the occasion arises. This practice 
appears to have been uniformly upheld on the theory that even 
though the administrator cannot delegate the power to sign the 
subpoena, he may sign the document in blank, permitting his 
assistants to fill it out. 62 
In several NLRB cases, a question arose whether the power to 
revoke subpoenas could be delegated to trial examiners. The 
60 Sec In re Albert Lindley Lee Mem. Hospital, 209 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1953) ; Fal-
sone v. United States, 205 F.2d 734 (5th Cir. 1953) . Indeed, language in these two cases 
suggests a possibility that some courts would be willing to permit an agency to obtain 
by subpoena privileged information, were the public need sufficiently impelling, 
on the theory that since agencies are not bound to observe the common law ex-
clusionary rules of evidence, they should also be free to disregard the rules as to 
privileged communications. It seems more likely, however, that the courts will under-
take the accommodation of competing policies by restrictive interpretations of the scope 
of the asserted privilege. 
61 In the early 1940's, the decision in Cudahy Packing Co. v. Holland, 315 U.S. 357 
(1942) , was generally considered to stand for tl1e proposition that the power to issue 
subpoenas could not be delegated by agency heads to staff assistants, unless the statute 
provided for such delegation. This case has been limited, however, on the basis that 
the result in that case must be explained on the particular legislative history of the 
enactment there involved. The attitude of the courts now appears to be that the 
power to delegate issuance of subpoenas should be sustained unless the statute plainly 
or by necessary implication prohibits such delegation. See Fleming v. Mohawk Wreck-
ing & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111 (1947); NLRB v. Lewis, 249 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1957), 
aff'd, 357 U.S. 10 (1958); NLRB v. John S. Barnes Corp., 178 F.2d 156 (7th Cir. 1949). 
62 See NLRB v. Lewis, supra note 61; Jackson Packing Co. v. NLRB, 204 F.2d 842 
(5th Cir. 1953); NLRB v. Pesante, 119 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Cal. 1954). 
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language of the act was clearly susceptible to a construction that 
this power could not be delegated, and some of the lower courts 
so held. 63 But it is now established that this delegation is per-
mitted. 64 
Whether a staff attorney is a "party" entitled to obtain issu-
ance of a subpoena was doubted in some of the early cases.65 
But later cases find no difficulty in sustaining the right of a staff 
attorney to obtain issuance of a subpoena in a matter with which 
he is officially concerned. 66 
The attitude of the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court 
appears to be that so long as respondent has the protection af-
forded by his right to demand that a district judge pass upon 
the reasonableness of the demand for information, 67 no harm is 
done in permitting delegation to staff assistants of power to take 
action with reference to the issuance, revocation, and applications 
for enforcement of subpoenas. Indeed, it is suggested that be-
cause of their greater familiarity with the details of the cases in-
volved, these staff assistants are in a much better position than are 
their superior officers to exercise intelligent discretion on the 
appropriateness of the requested demand. 
G. "Unnecessary Examinations" 
The Internal Revenue Code, in providing that no taxpayer 
shall be subjected to "unnecessary examination,"68 imposes a re-
striction on the Internal Revenue Service to which most other 
agencies are not subject. 
63 NLRB v. Duval Jewelry Co., 243 F.2d 427 (5th Cir. 1957), rev'd, 857 U.S. l 
(1958) ; NLRB v. Pesante, supra note 62. 
64 In Duval Jewelry Co. v. NLRB, 357 U.S. 1 (1958), the result was reached on the 
basis that there was only a partial delegation of authority, with the Board itself re-
taining supervisory power. In NLRB v. International Typographical Union, 76 F. Supp. 
895 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), Judge Medina reached the same result on the theory that such 
delegation was permitted by the AP A. Other courts have reached the same result on 
the apparent theory that the labor law did not prohibit such delegation. See NLRB v. 
Lewis, 249 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1957), afj'd, 357 U.S. 10 (1958) ; NLRB v. Gunaca, 135 
F. Supp. 790 (E.D. Wis. 1955) , afj'd, 230 F.2d 542 (7th Cir. 1956) . 
65 See, e.g., NLRB v. Pesante, 119 F. Supp. 444 (S.D. Cal. 1954) • 
66 See NLRB v. Lewis, 249 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1957), afj'd, 357 U.S. 10 (1958); NLRB 
v. Duval Jewelry Co., 243 F.2d 427 (5th Cir .. 1957), rev'd, 357 U.S. 1 (1958) • 
67 This would seem to be the key of the matter. See concurring opinion of Mr. 
Justice Jackson in Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking 8: Lumber Co., 331 U.S. Ill, 123 
(1947). 
68 INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7605. 
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The cases applying this provision draw a distinction between 
cases where the investigation is directed to the taxpayer himself 
and cases where the investigation is directed to a third party.69 
In the former case, the statutory caveat has had little effect in 
reducing the agency's discovery powers. In such cases the phrase 
is construed as designed only to prevent uselessly repetitive pro-
cedures and investigations not relevant to any possible tax lia-
bility. 70 
However, where the subpoena is directed to a third party 
whose tax liability is not involved but who is in possession of 
records which may have a bearing on the tax liability of the tax-
payer whose liability is under investigation, the courts have fre-
quently refused to enforce the administrative demand on the 
theory that the investigation has not been shown to be necessary.71 
In such cases, the statutory caveat against "unnecessary examina-
tions" was apparently relied on as a basis for refusing to enforce 
subpoenas which the court deemed unreasonably broad under the 
circumstances. 
III. A SUGGESTED CURE FOR THE CURRENT CONFUSION 
Only two conclusions can safely be derived from an examina-
tion of the decisions of the lower federal courts applying the tests 
of the Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. case.72 They are: (I) the 
tests are imprecise; (2) their application lacks consistency. This 
result is unfortunate both from the viewpoint of the agencies and 
from that of respondents. 
There is a need, surely, for legislation. Even though the ques-
tions involved may be of such a nature as to defy the ingenuity 
of draftsmen to phrase a statutory standard that will be capable 
of precise and equitable application in all the varied instances in 
which the question of enforcing a subpoena may arise, at least it 
would be possible to lay down a few fundamental guides. 
Both the Hoover Commission Task Force on Legal Services 
69 E.g., Application of Levine, 149 F. Supp. 642 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd per curiam, 243 
F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1956) . 
70 See United States v. Carroll, 246 F.2d 762 (2d Cir. 1957). 
71 See Local 174, Teamsters Union v. United States, 240 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1956); 
First Nat'! Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947) ; United States ex rel. 
Sathre v. Third N.W. Nat'! Bank, 102 F. Supp. 879 (D. Minn. 1952) . 
72 327 U.S. 186 (1946). 
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and Procedure and the American Bar Association drafting com-
mittee have recognized the need for procedural provisions which 
would clear up a part of the existing uncertainty by providing 
that any person subjected to an agency subpoena may, before 
compliance and upon timely petition, obtain from a federal dis-
trict court a ruling as to its lawfulness; and requiring the court 
to quash the subpoena if it is found to be unreasonable in terms, 
irrelevant in scope, or beyond the jurisdiction of the agency. 
Such procedural provisions would be most helpful. But there 
is a need for something more-for some enunciation of basic 
policy that will serve as a touchstone in the application of the 
0 klahoma Press tests. Such a need might in substantial measure 
be met by legislation which applied to all federal agencies a 
limitation ( derived from the provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code) that subpoenas should be enforceable only where the dis-
closure sought was demonstrably necessary. 
